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BOOK REVIEW 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: CORRECTING MISCONCEP-
TIONS ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Prohibitive Policy: Implementing The Federal Endangered 
Species Act. By Steven Lewis Yaffee, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1982, pp. 239. 
Environmental Policy Implementation: Planning and Manage-
ment Options and Their Consequences. By Dean E. Mann (ed.), 
Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Company, 1982, pp. 261. 
Reviewed by Berton L. Lamb* 
Americans today are often aware of public policy issues; rarely 
are they well-informed about them.1 While there is a flood of 
available information, it has been made practically inaccessible to 
the public because it has not been assembled into coherent and 
accessible form. This practical inaccessibility reflects the current 
reliance by policy makers and analysts on data accumulation as 
the primary tool of policy analysis, as opposed to data synthesis 
and integration. It is a reliance which affects both the public's and 
officials' ability to respond to environmental issues, for it has 
become the main stumbling block to implementing environmental 
policy. It has focused officials on the scientific and objective "ra-
tionality" of proposed alternatives, rather than on their political 
feasibility. 
Both Steven Lewis Yaffee, in Prohibitive Policy: Implementing 
• Dr. Lamb is a Management Analyst with the Instream Flow and Aquatic Systems 
Group, Western Energy and Land Use Team, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Fort Collins, 
Colorado. Views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the policy of the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. 
1. Boorstin, Informed But Ignorant, The Denver Post, Sept. 6, 1982 at 6. See also, 
Lerner & Wanat, Fuzziness and Bureaucracy, 43 PUBUC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 
500-10 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Lerner & Wanat]. 
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the Endangered Species Act,2 and Dean E. Mann, in Environmen-
tal Policy Implementation: Planning and Management Options 
and Their Consequences,3 attempt to increase our understanding 
of the political climate in which environmental legislation is im-
plemented. At the heart of their analyses is a critique of a dichot-
omy which has long held sway in the public and official imagina-
tion: that politics ends where policy implementation begins.4 Both 
authors attribute the difficulties that applied scientists in gov-
ernment have with the administrative process to scientists' inac-
curate perception of politics and administration as separate func-
tions. 
Policy implementation requires applied scientists to look be-
yond technical alternatives and understand human, institutional, 
and political processes. The false expectation that politics will not 
invade policy implementation can lead to inappropriate tests of 
the adequacy of the implementation process and to inaccurate 
judgments of the success of policy. Both Mann and Yaffee identify 
the two major misconceptions that lead to implementation fail-
ures when only "objective" scientific judgement is involved. First, 
policy makers assume that implementors can effectively deal with 
both internal and system-wide policy inconsistencies, even when a 
policy design is intended only to resolve short-term, narrowly-
defined "political" criteria. In such cases, policy makers incor-
rectly believe that implementing agencies will integrate the "pol-
icy pieces" through a process of negotiated adjustment. Second, 
policy implementors assume that politics ends with the writing of 
statutes and regulations, and that all that remains for them to do 
is to reach conclusions and take actions based on technical analy-
ses. 
These two misconceptions can result in ineffective policy im-
plementation. Most policies cannot be written to address all possi-
ble variables and outcomes; flexibility, pragmatism, and a sense of 
the "political realities" are necessary to implement policy in ways 
2. S. Y AFFEE, PRomBITIVE POllCY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL, ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT (1982) [hereinafter cited as YAFFEE]. 
3. D. MANN, ENVIRONMENTAL POllCY IMPLEMENTATION: PLANNING AND MANAGE-
MENT OPTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (1982) [hereinafter cited as MANN]. 
4. The notion of a politics/administration dichotomy rests on the separation of powers 
set forth in the United States Constitution. Early writers who promoted this view are: F. 
TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1917); PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE 
OF ADMINISTRATION (L. Gulick & L. Urwick ed. 1937). See also Rosenbloom, Public 
Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers, 43 PUBllC ADMINISTRATION RE-
VIEW 219-226 (1983). 
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that overcome design shortcomings. Unfortunately, applied scien-
tists with the requisite technical expertise to implement envi-
ronmental regulation also frequently possess professionally in-
grained expectations that their agency should only collect, ana-
lyze, and report facts and act according to established routines.5 
They are focused on the "rationality" of policy, not on its feasibil-
ity. Not, that is, on its technical and political attainability, a 
criterion which Environmental Policy Implementation con-
tributor Marcus argues should replace rationality as the primary 
criterion of policy choice.6 The result is intra-agency struggles 
over political versus technical decisions. Because the connection 
between political and technological decision-making is not well-
understood, the bargaining required to implement loosely con-
structed statutes becomes frustrating to most technical experts 
and misunderstood by the general public. 
Even tightly-written policies require bargaining and compro-
mise in their implementation. For example, seemingly straight-
forward decisions, such as whether or not a species is endangered 
or a chemical is toxic, can become extremely political when per-
sons with an economic interest in the decision attempt to affect its 
outcome. More subtle political factors can also be involved, such 
as competition among scientists with different research pro-
grams, the incompatibility of available methodologies, and the 
relative influence of the applied scientists involved in selecting 
the technological options. 
Prohibitive Policy 
The connection between technological and political decision-
making in policy implementation is nowhere less understood-by 
both the public and experts-than in the area of prohibitive 
policy. The term "prohibitive policy" refers to formal policy state-
ments (e.g. statutes) which are absolutely prescriptive. Such 
statements set forth both policy goals and their means of im-
plementation, leaving administrators little apparent room for dis-
cretion in implementation. Yaffee's thesis is that even prohibitive 
5. For a discussion of the resistance to change which arises because of these expecta-
tions, see C. FRANKEL, HIGH ON FOGGY BOTTOM (1969); F.C. MOSHER & J. E. HARR, 
PROGRAMMING SYSTEMS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEADERSIDP: AN ATTEMPTED INNOVA-
TION (1973). 
6. A. Marcus, Converting Thought to Action: The Use of Economic Incentives to Reduce 
Pollution, in MANN, supra note 3, at 182-3. 
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policy is executed through a political process-that of inter- and 
intra-agency bargaining and compromise.7 
The common wisdom runs counter to Yaffee's thesis. Indeed, 
environmentalists often work hard to develop statutes which are 
as restrictive and unambiguous as possible. They do so to ensure 
that there is very little room for interpretation. A prohibitive 
policy statement such as the Endangered Species Act is spe-
cifically designed to disallow certain actions. It is commonly be-
lieved that such a policy is strict, even hidebound. Yaffee de-
scribes prohibitive policy as follows: 
Not only does it prescribe the goals or ends of social policy, 
but it appears to define the means to reach the ends without 
allowing for alternative (perhaps innovative or more cost-
effective) approaches to the same goals.8 
Nevertheless, Yaffee argues that it is wrong to assume that pro-
hibitive policy is intended to be strictly implemented. He also 
argues that the outcome of such policy is not, in fact, prohibitive.9 
By implication, Yaffee reasons that all environmental policy ad-
ministration has both substantive and political aspects. The es-
sential truth for him is that environmental policy implementation 
is more political than technological. He makes two points. First, 
"uncertainty is rampant throughout these decisions, even when 
they appear to be based on science." Second, implementing policy 
is like marketing: "the medium of exchange in this marketplace is 
power, and the mode of interaction is negotiation."lo 
Put another way, it is within the political parts of the adminis-
trative process that environmental policy implementation prob-
lems are resolved. Y affee argues that policy improvements should 
be focused on adminstrative coordination and on planning pro-
cesses within the federal bureacracy. They must lead to effective 
management routines, efficient inter-agency conflict resolution 
patterns, and increased political skill for mid-level managers. 
Such improvements in the agency decision-making process will be 
increasingly important in light of the frequency of judicial re-
viewY 
7. Y AFFEE, supra note 4. 
8. ld. at 1. 
9. ld. at 5. 
10. ld. at 7. 
11. Zimmerman, Anatomy of Environmental Regulation, J. OF URB. PLAN. & DEV. 
17102 (1982). 
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Indeed, it is litigation challenging policy implementation deci-
sions which reveal the misconceptions of policy execution. The 
adversary process illuminates the fact that implementation 
should be more than a technical process. Sometimes such a reve-
lation leads to the design of policy so that administrative discre-
tion is limited. The importance of Yaffee's argument is that the 
political nature of implementation cannot be fully overcome by 
such limitations. Rather, he seems to be saying that good policy 
should be tightly written but should recognize the struggles in-
volved in administrative processes. 
Yaffee supports his argument by reporting on the problems and 
progress in implementing the Endangered Species Act of 1977,12 
This discussion is especially pertinent since the Act is frequently 
under consideration for amendment. Yaffee finds that the Act has 
been shaped by some type of political process throughout its 
history. Of course, its passage was the result of the legislative 
political process, but Yaffee also finds administrative political 
struggles in all phases of its implementation. He asserts that the 
Act is an example of prohibitive policy which has been adminis-
tered non-prohibitively-that is, through compromise. 
Yaffee argues that most assumptions about the effects of pro-
hibitive policy on implementation are incorrect. Technological 
choices, enforcement, and rule making are not made less dis-
cretionary by prohibitive policy. Indeed, environmental policy, 
however framed, is characterized by: 
discretionary judgements ... about what species to review in 
what order, which experts to talk with, what data to believe, 
what degree of regulation to propose, what external interests 
to consider, and what regulatory exceptions to allow,13 
Yaffee's discussion of the implementation of the Endangered 
Species Act proves illuminating. The task of listing endangered 
species is enormous: it would take one person many years to 
complete the necessary research on a single given species. A 
team of scientists might complete the research on one species in a 
year. But of the 198 employees in the Endangered Species pro-
gram in 1978, only eight were assigned to listing. Most of the 
others were involved in interagency consultation-the "squeak-
12. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (16 u.s.c. §§ 
1531-1543). 
13. YAFFEE, supra note 7, at 70. 
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ing wheel" of the program. i4 This demonstrates that the program 
depends for its success on resolving political struggles between 
agencies rather than technical problems. 
Furthermore, implementation was subject to intra-agency bar-
gaining.i5 All those species which are in fact endangered cannot 
be listed because of time and resource constraints. Setting priori-
ties among species is determined by the relative influence of: 
1) distinct professional groups acting within the agency; 2) differ-
ent interest groups-such as ones composed of scientists, devel-
opers, or environmentalists-who lobby the administrators; 3) in-
dividuals in professional networks who are consulted for informa-
tion on different species. 
Finally, in the Endangered Species program even purely "sci-
entific" decisions are negotiated: 
Negotiation was facilitated by a hierarchical administrative 
network in which scientific expertise was concentrated at 
lower levels and management and political skills at higher 
levels. Goals, rewards, and agendas varied throughout this 
network, forming a dynamic system with significant 
pressures to resolve controversies at the lowest possible 
internal level. The success of this system at building com-
promise suggests that even when policies are prohibitive the 
context of implementation provides a vehicle for the balanc-
ing of social costS.i6 
Yaffee concludes that the guidance offered by the Act and its 
legislative history are not sufficient to explain agency behavior. A 
better understanding of how a policy is implemented would in-
clude analysis of "internal forces," such as conflicting organiza-
tional goals and bureaucratic and scientific conservatism, which 
generally resist change and slow implementationP In addition, 
the administrative structure which executes the Endangered 
Species Act is under constant external pressure to alter its em-
phasis, products, and rate of action.is According to Yaffee: 
These pressures commonly come from internal advocates, 
interest groups, the media, and legislative and judicial 
sources. The dynamic interaction between these external 
pressures and internal characteristics in large measure de-
14. Id. at 71. 
15. Id. at 72-74. 
16. Id. at 86-87. 
17. Id. at 147. 
18. See generally Struck, Special Species: Interior Creates New Category, Salt Lake 
Tribune, Sept. 16, 1982, at 8, col. 5. 
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termines the outcome of implementation regardless of the 
fact that it was presumably clearly specified by a prohibitive 
statute.19 
907 
Understanding this dynamic is necessary for the effective writ-
ing and execution of environmental policy. The false dichotomy 
between politics and administration has been discussed in the 
professional literature for a generation,20 but it still apparently 
guides scientists, policy-makers and the public. 
Environmental Policy Implementation 
Like Yaffee, Mann recognizes that many applied scientists in 
the federal bureaucracy still believe that policy implementation is 
a fairly simple technical matter. He observes that there is: 
too much dependence on technology that might or might not 
prove efficacious; and too little realization that policy space is 
being so densely occupied that the success of anyone policy 
inevitably depends to some extent-and often to a crucial 
extent-on the performance of ... some other agency. The 
result is often failure ... 21 
Mann's collection teaches that there is a great deal of fact-
gathering and analytical calculation involved in designing and 
implementing environmental policy, but very little emphasis on 
understanding outcomes. In his introduction, Mann explains in 
detail three factors developed by Daniel Mazmanian and Paul 
Sabatier to explain the success of policy implementation out-
comes:22 
1) The tractability of the problem which a policy is in-
tended to solve; 
2) The ability of the statute to favorably structure the 
implementation process; and 
3) The effect of various political variables on the support 
for statutory objectives. 
Thus, Mann's introduction lends support to Yaffee's thesis: it 
doesn't matter whether a statute develops a prohibitive policy or 
19. YAFFEE, supra note 7, at 148. 
20. This issue has been long discussed and was fairly well settled by 1949. See generally 
D. WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POI.JTlCAL THEORY OF PUBI.JC 
ADMINISTRATION (1948). 
21. MANN, supra note 3, at 1; see also A. WILDAVSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF POI.JCY 
ANALYSIS (1979). 
22. "The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis," 8 POI.JCY STUD-
IES JOURNAL 538-60 (1980). 
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gives an agency absolute regulatory authority. Statutes requiring 
only consultation among agencies achieve as much success on 
some problems as do prohibitive policies, and sometimes more. In 
judging the quality of a given policy and its likelihood of success, 
the public and agency experts must understand the political envi-
ronment in which it is to be implemented. Mann observes that: 
The achievement of the goals of environmental protection ... 
depend on sound assumptions about the behaviour of indi-
viduals, groups ... and public institutions. Environmental 
policy may fall far short of its goals if the premises about 
motivations, incentives, and constraints are improperly 
structured into the decision-making system.23 
The theme in most of the articles in Environmental Policy 
Implementation is that of Mann's introduction to the collection. 
Technical issues in policy implementation are usually less com-
plex than the political and institutional problems of policy im-
plementation. The many pressures from constituents, scientists, 
and politicians mean that even choices of technology, technolog-
ical approach, or expert recommendations are bargained over 
inside an agency before they are forwarded to higher administra-
tive levels. Article author James L. Regen, for instance, reports 
that: 
Attempts to implement RARE II [a wilderness planning pro-
gram] reveal that efforts to treat it as a comprehensive 
mechanism for policy choice isolated from the ongoing na-
tional debate over energy-involvement trade-offs have been 
unsuccessful.24 
As Regen points out, the unfortunate result is that the RARE 
II experience may be falsely interpreted as proof that com-
prehensive planning techniques do not work. Instead, RARE II 
should teach us that comprehensive planning methods need to be 
applied with an awareness of their political context. 
Supporting this point, article author Donald C. Cell argues that 
policy failure in the pollution control area is often caused by "a 
standard regulatory approach [that] has been applied to different 
pollution situations indiscriminately."25 That is, standardized pol-
icies or responses make sense in general but are often irrational 
23. MANN, supra note 3, at 11. 
24. J. Regen, Equity Issues and Wilderness Preservation: Policy Implications for the 
Energy-Environment Tangle, in MANN, supra note 3, at 74. 
25. D. Cell, Charges to Control Aircraft Noise, in MANN, supra note 3, at 169. 
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in particular situations. In some situations, routine and standard 
agency approaches obscure the needed intuitive understanding of 
environmental issues. Based on this perspective, the proper crite-
rion for assessment of policy implementation clearly seems to be 
one of feasibility. 
Like Yaffee, the contributors to Mann's collection seem to agree 
that the successful implementation of environmental policy de-
pends on many factors, including constant attention to the politi-
cal elements of the implementation process. No matter what the 
nature of a particular statute or regulation, implementation is 
ultimately negotiated. Moreover, narrowly designed solutions 
often cause unanticipated conflicts, since they do not take into 
account the numbers of competing environmental problems and 
policies which impinge upon one another. The misconception is 
that personal and agency behavior can be ignored in favor of 
concentration on data analysis. Both Prohibitive Policy and Man-
aging Environmental Policy argue for knowledgeable policy de-
sign which takes into account these factors. 
CONCLUSION 
Because most regulatory decisions are negotiated, those who 
make or execute policy should understand more than the techni-
cal data underlying their proposed alternatives. Given the com-
plexity of policy and the interconnected nature of outcomes, a 
knowledge of how the regulatory process really works is essential. 
As R.D. Behn has observed in "Policy Analysis and Policy Poli-
tics," there are two principal players in policy-making-the 
analysts and the politicians.26 Unless the analysts, such as the 
technicians and applied scientists working within the Executive 
Branch, are willing to stand by as their carefully-crafted alterna-
tives are discarded to placate various constituencies, they must 
improve their knowledge of the political part of the game.27 For as 
Yaffee argues, even prohibitive policy-which would seem to be 
the kind of policy least subject to political influence in its 
implementation-is implemented by bargaining and compromise. 
While the point that analysts must understand the political na-
ture of the implementation process has often been made, Mann's 
collection and Yaffee's book are valuable contributions to this 
perennially important topic. 
26. Behn, Policy Analysis and Policy Politics, POllCY ANALYSIS 199 (Spring, 1981). 
27. Id. at 226. 
